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The much-anticipated Balanced Scorecard Framework for determining the 
remuneration of representatives and supervisors in the financial advisory industry 
came into force on 1 January 2016. The framework is a major development and is 
likely to transform the industry. This article seeks to explain the framework and its 
challenges. 
 
The Balanced Scorecard Framework for 
Financial Advisers: 
A Pandora’s Box? 
 
Introduction 
 
It was some seven years ago when the collapse of Lehman Brothers led to the structured products crisis which 
impoverished countless investors around the globe. The ensuing years witnessed a slew of regulatory changes. 
In Singapore, the most significant of the changes so far as relates to conduct of business (“COB”) include, 
chronologically: 
 
1.    the issuance of the Guidelines on Fair Dealing1 by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS”); 
 
2.    the extension of the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act2 to financial products; 
 
3.    the issuance of the MAS Tenets of Effective Regulation;3 
 
4.    the issuance of a new Notice on Recommendations on Investment Products4 to deal with, inter alia, clients’ 
investment knowledge and enhanced due diligence for complex products; and 
 
5.    the addition of a regulation 18B to the Financial Advisers Regulations to deal with management responsibility 
for the approval of new products. 
 
The Balanced Scorecard Framework (“BSF”), the culmination of a consultative process5 which began in October 
2014, is the latest of the new regulatory measures. 
 
The change is effected through four6 instruments: 
 
1.    An amendment to the Financial Advisers Act7 (“FAA”); 
 
2.    The Financial Advisers (Remuneration) Regulations 20158 (“FARR”); 
 
3.    MAS Notice FAA-N209 (on BSF); and 
 
4.    MAS Guideline FAA-G1410 (on BSF). 
 
The FAA is amended by the introduction of s 22A, which requires financial advisers (“FA”s) to have remuneration 
systems (for their representatives and supervisors) which are in accordance with FARR and MAS regulations. 
The amendment adds a Division 5, on remuneration, wherein s 38 requires an FA to establish and maintain the 
said remuneration framework and s 39 requires an FA to have an independent sales audit unit (“ISA unit”). The 
contravention by an FA of its BSF obligations is a serious offence and attracts a fine not exceeding $25,000.11 
 
The FARR essentially says12 that payment under remuneration systems other than the BSF is not allowed 
apart from exempted categories, namely FAs and representatives who are exempted from ss 25, 26, 27 and 36 
FAA and the counterpart MAS Notices13 and service/sale to accredited investors, expert investors and 
institutional investors.14 Remuneration which is “not dependent, directly or indirectly” on the number or value of 
contracts, and thus not “variable income”,15 is also exempted16 as is remuneration in relation to the products 
within the Schedule.17 
 
Notice N20 is one of the two key pieces of regulation (the Guidelines being the other) as to the BSF. It provides 
for the workings of the BSF (and the ISA Unit) and emphasises the responsibility of the senior management in 
relation to the BSF. The Notice has three annexes: Annex 1 which specifies the non-sales KPIs, Annex 2 which 
contains the Quarterly Report Form18 and Annex 3 which provides detailed worked examples of such a report. 
 
The Guidelines reinforce and add to the Notice, providing details on the full workings of the BSF, including 
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documentation review, client surveys, classification of infractions and the consequences of classification. 
 
The Guidelines also have three annexes – Annex 1 on documentation reviews, Annex 2 on client surveys and 
Annex 3 on examples of Category 1 (or major) infractions. 
 
BSF – Concept and Philosophy 
 
The balanced scorecard is essentially a performance management tool or system.19 Popularised by Kaplan & 
Norton, it adds non-financial performance measures or indicators to the financial metrics in order to give a more 
“balanced” view of performance.20 
 
As explained by MAS in its consultative paper,21 the aim of the BSF: 
 
… is to better align the interests of FA representatives and supervisors with that of their customers and 
minimize conflicts with customers’ interests that are inherent in volume-based remuneration 
arrangements (emphasis added). 
The more direct and immediate impact of the BSF is that representatives and their supervisors receive 
remuneration which takes into account the manner in which they perform their professional service. 
Philosophically, representatives and supervisors are (only) entitled to, and will receive, remuneration that accords 
with their effort and professional responsibility. Practically, they will receive what may be termed “infractions-
discounted commission”. The BSF, it is said, “incentivises fair dealing conduct”.22 
 
The challenge is to measure, accurately and efficiently, the performance by the representatives and supervisors 
of the due diligence requirements expected of them. 
 
The larger regulatory objective is to put in place a system for the monitoring and measuring of due diligence and 
to “measure the achievement of the fair dealing outcomes”.23 
 
The Non-financial Indicators 
 
The balanced scorecard concept focuses on non-financial indicators. The BSF refers to “non-sales key 
performance indicators” or non-sales KPIs. The non-sales KPIs are set out in Annex 1 of the Notice as follows: 
 
1.    KPI 1 - understanding a client’s needs; 
 
2.    KPI 2 - suitability of product recommendations; 
 
3.    KPI 3 - adequacy of information disclosure; and 
 
4.    KPI 4 - professional and ethical conduct in providing service. 
 
An FA may incorporate other KPIs into the framework but these other KPIs should not be used to determine a 
representative’s entitlement to remuneration.24 
 
The four non-sales KPIs are supremely important to the BSF. Broadly speaking, they reflect the due diligence 
requirements captured in the FAA (primarily ss 25, 26 and 27), the relevant MAS Notices, the FDG and the 
regulator’s “fit and proper person” expectation of FAs and their representatives and supervisors. Each of these is 
elaborated upon in Annex 1 of the Notice and further explained and illustrated in Annex 1 (“Guidance for 
documentation reviews”) and Annex 2 (“Guidance for client surveys”) of the Guidelines. We shall consider each 
of them in turn. 
 
Understanding a Client’s Needs 
 
On this first KPI, the Annex states: 
 
A representative must take reasonable steps to conduct a sufficient fact-find to understand the 
circumstances and needs of his clients. 
The language is reminiscent of the wording of s 27(2) FAA, which says that an FA does not have a reasonable 
basis for making his recommendation (RBR, for short) unless, he has, inter alia, had regard to “the information 
possessed by him concerning the investment objectives, financial situation and particular needs” of the client. 
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The information the “Know Your Client” (“KYC”) exercise should extend to is catalogued in the MAS Notice on 
Recommendations on Investment Products.25 
 
The Annex reiterates the importance of collecting and documenting all pertinent client information. It also asks if 
the representative “influenced” the client’s inputs and responses during the fact-find stage. Examples of 
infractions of KPI 1 are given in Annex 3 of the Guidelines and they include the failure to conduct Customer 
Knowledge Assessment in respect of a complex product and the failure to find out the customer’s source of 
income. 
 
The client information required in outline by s 27(2) and in detail by Notice N16 is carried through in the Guidance 
for documentation reviews (Annex 1 of Guidelines). Basically, the question in the Guidance asks if the 
representative had documented all the relevant client details. For each of the items, a “Yes” or “No”26 response is 
envisaged. 
 
As we move to the Guidance for client surveys, Annex 2 has the specific question: “Did the representative ask 
you questions in order to understand your financial situation, investment objective and risk appetite before 
recommending an investment product?” Here, the answer options are: “Yes”, “No”, “Cannot Recall” and “Others”. 
 
A few thoughts here. First, the “Cannot Recall” option is a pragmatic and fair one; but to the extent that this option 
is resorted to, the review does not achieve its purpose. 
 
A second and more fundamental thought. The inquiry is whether the representative asked the client the relevant 
questions; could it be that the more pertinent question is: “Did it appear to you that the representative understood 
your financial situation, investment objective and risk appetite before recommending an investment product?” 
  
The second question in the Guidance for client surveys may cause even more problems. It asks: “Was there any 
instance during the financial advisory process where you felt your representative had influenced you to provide 
an answer or influenced you to modify your original answer that you are uncomfortable with as it is inaccurate or 
does not represent your intention?” (emphasis added). Suffice it to say that the words in bold (and others) run 
the risk of inadequate, imperfect or incorrect understanding, perception or recollection by the client, not to 
mention the possibility27 of the client being, to varying degrees, dishonest, unfair or unreasonable. 
 
Suitability of Product Recommendations 
 
In Annex 1 of the Notice, KPI 2 is titled “Suitability of product recommendations” while the text elaboration reads: 
 
A representative must have a reasonable basis for any recommendation made to a client and must take 
into account the client’s financial objectives, investment horizon, risk profile, financial situation and 
particular circumstances and needs. 
Of course this is a concise condensation of s 27(1) and s 27(2). 
 
If we look at the wording of s 27 FAA, arguably the cornerstone of COB regulation in the FAA, there is no express 
mention of product suitability; instead, the representative only needs to have a reasonable basis for his 
recommendation which, hopefully, leads to product suitability. 
 
However, product suitability is mentioned in the FDG – fair dealing outcome two is that “financial institutions offer 
products and services that are suitable for their target customer segments”. This ideal or expectation is now 
encapsulated in reg 18B of the Financial Advisers Regulations, which requires an FA, before selling or marketing 
a new product, to carry out a due diligence exercise to ascertain whether the product is suitable for its targeted 
clients. 
 
The RBR requirements of s 27 are bolstered by Notice N 16, para 31, which specifically requires the FA to 
explain the basis for recommendation to the client and to document the basis. Annex 1 of the Guidelines follows 
up by asking three questions:28 
 
1.    Did the representative document the assumptions used for his recommendations and are these assumptions 
reasonable? 
 
2.    Did the representative conduct risk profiling for the client? and 
 
3.    Did the representative recommend an investment product which: 
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a.    meets the financial objectives of the client? 
 
b.    is affordable to the client? 
 
c.    is aligned with the client’s investment horizon? 
 
d.    matches the client’s risk profile? 
 
e.    takes into account the client’s concentration risk? or 
 
f.    takes into account the particular needs of the client? 
 
This set of questions is of great importance. In carrying out the review and assessment, the ISA Unit makes a 
judgment on whether the representative’s recommendation is suitable for the client. Does the 
recommendation/product meet the client’s objectives or does it not? Does it match the client’s risk profile or does 
it not? But the fundamental question is: does an inquiry into suitability necessarily lead to a binary result – that 
the recommendation/product is either suitable or unsuitable? For sure, there will be instances where this binary 
approach would work, such as where the client wishes to have a capital guaranteed product but the 
representative recommended a non-capital guaranteed product29 or where a representative recommends an 
insurance plan where the monthly premium exceeds the client’s monthly disposable income.30 
 
But quite often, it may lead to a range or spectrum of results, such as clearly 
unsuitable/unsuitable/suitable/clearly suitable/most suitable? If so, then pushing for a binary result may lead to 
inaccuracy and unfairness. 
 
Another difficult question is – are all representatives measured by one standard as to product suitability? Are all 
representatives held to the same standard of knowledge and expertise, or should the enquiry take into account 
their years of experience? There is no easy answer. 
 
Annex 2 of the Guidelines follows up with this pertinent and very direct question for the client survey: “Did you 
understand the representative’s explanation as to why the product is suitable for you?” 
 
Adequacy of Information Disclosure 
 
KPI 3 is essentially a combination of the product disclosure requirements of s 25 and s 26 of FAA (and the 
relevant MAS Notices),31 namely that the representative must disclose all material product information and must 
not make false or misleading statements. Annex 1 of the Guidelines follows up with these matters with a checklist 
whilst Annex 2 goes into greater detail as to disclosure of key aspects of particular products such as structured 
deposits, unit trusts and bonds. 
 
Professional and Ethical Conduct 
 
KPI 4 is titled “Standards of professionalism and ethical conduct in relation to the provision of financial advisory 
services” and the text explains that unprofessional and unethical acts, other than those under non-sales KPIs 
refer to: 
 
(a)    acts involving fraud, dishonesty, or other offences of a similar nature, misrepresentation, or acts involving 
non-compliance of regulatory requirements or serious breach of the FA’s internal policy or code of conduct which 
would render the representative liable to demotion, suspension or termination of the representative’s employment 
or arrangement with the FA; and 
 
(b)    acts that impinge on the fitness and propriety of representatives set out in the Guidelines on Fit and Proper 
Criteria (FSG- G01). 
 
The ambit of KPI 4 is certainly very wide. It is observed that the items in para (a) overlap substantially with KPIs 1 
to 3. 
 
Paragraph (b) in substance is similar to KPI 4, on professionalism and ethics. The specified32 fit and proper 
criteria cover a broad spectrum of qualities – honesty, integrity, reputation, competence, capability and financial 
soundness. It is worth adding, at the risk of repetition and overlap, that FA and his representatives are expected 
to perform their functions “efficiently, honestly and fairly” and “in the best interests of its clients”.33 
 
The ISA Unit’s mandate and task, in this regard, is extremely broad. Annex 3 of the Guidelines gives examples of 
unprofessional and unethical conduct and they include: 
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1.    Falsifying client’s responses in the fact-find form in order to place the client in higher risk category; 
 
2.    Delaying an execution of a client’s instruction in order to accumulate the representative’s sales volume for 
the next quarter; 
 
3.    Asking a client to pre-sign a blank fact-find form; 
 
4.    Harassing a client who is not interested in purchasing any product; and 
 
5.    Failing to meet a client but instead asking an unauthorised person to meet him. 
 
Some guidance is also given in Annexes 1 and 2 of the Guidelines.34 
 
The Workings of the BSF 
 
The BSF envisages a system whereby the sales transactions and performance of all representatives and 
supervisors are regularly checked and assessed by an independent sales audit unit (“ISA Unit”) and overseen 
and acted upon by the FA’s board and senior management.35 
 
As the name suggests, the ISA Unit has to be independent of the financial advisory services unit (or sales unit) 
which it audits; it must not directly or indirectly supervise or manage the conduct or performance of the 
representatives it is auditing.36 
 
Equally important, the persons in the ISA Unit need to be competent (a point to which we will return). They must 
be able to review the quality of the services against the non-sales KPIs and determine (correctly and fairly) if 
infractions have been committed.37 The ISA Unit’s responsibilities can be done internally, such as by its 
compliance or risk management department/unit, or outsourced to a third party provider.38 
 
The role of the ISA Unit is to perform quarterly review and assessment on representatives and supervisors. The 
tasks are: 
 
1.    To carry out post-transactions checks on sampled39 transactions, using documentation reviews and client 
surveys (via phone calls, face-to-face interviews, written surveys and electronic surveys);40 
 
2.    To classify infractions uncovered by the post-transaction checks as either Category 1 infractions or Category 
2 infractions; and 
 
3.    To report to the FA. 
 
In addition to infractions uncovered by the ISA Unit’s post-transaction checks, the FA is also required to act on 
findings from mystery shopping exercises conducted and complaints it has received.41 Where the FA’s review 
and assessment conclude that infractions have been committed, such infractions must also be included in the 
BSF report. 
 
Classification of Infractions 
 
The BSF is concerned with uncovering infractions in relation to the non-sales KPIs. The Notice classifies the 
infractions into Category 1 infractions, Category 2 infractions and “disregardable” infractions. 
 
A Category 1 infraction is one which has “a material impact on the interests of the client” or which impinges on 
the fitness and propriety of the representative.42 So the infraction can be regarded as serious either in terms of 
how it affects the client or how it reflects on the conduct of the representative. The Notice gives five examples of 
Category 1 infractions:43 
 
1.    Recommending a product that is “clearly unsuitable” for the client; 
 
2.    Unnecessary switching of products and for the representative’s benefit; 
 
3.    Failure to provide or explain information which, if had been disclosed to the client  “would have resulted” in 
the client not purchasing the product; 
 
4.    Failing to execute a client’s instructions without valid cause and the failure resulted in the client incurring 
“material losses”; and 
 
5.    Where the representative has carried out any act of “misrepresentation, gross negligence or serious 
misconduct”. 
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Some observations are in order here. 
 
Example (1) speaks of a “clearly unsuitable” recommendation. Does this suggest that a borderline unsuitable 
recommendation is not a Category 1 infraction? 
 
Examples (3) and (4) encapsulate the concept of causation – the infraction must cause44 loss to the client. This is 
an interesting concession towards the representative. Note, in contrast, that a failure to disclose material product 
information is an offence under s 25(5) FAA even if it did not result in loss to the client. 
 
Example (5) lists misrepresentation, gross negligence and serious misconduct as Category 1 infractions. The 
terms appear to suggest that only grave errors – gross negligence in contrast to ordinary negligence and serious 
misconduct as opposed to not so serious conduct – are Category 1 infractions. However, misrepresentation 
covers a spectrum of culpability – fraudulent, negligent and innocent. Arguably, only fraudulent and grossly 
negligent misrepresentations should count as Category 1 infractions. Negligent and innocent misrepresentations 
should perhaps be Category 2 infractions. 
 
Category 2 infractions are infractions in relation to the four non-sales KPIs but in circumstances where the 
infractions are not so serious.45 
 
Apart from Category 1 and Category 2 infractions, there is a category of “disregardable” infractions. These are 
“minor lapses or administrative oversights … which [do] not affect client’s interest or impinge on the fitness and 
propriety of a representative”.46 In such cases, the FA “may allow” the ISA Unit to not consider them as 
infractions. The Notice gives a simple example of the representative not filling in the name of the client’s 
dependants where such failure did not affect the result of the needs analysis.47 
 
Just as the line between Category 1 and Category 2 infractions is difficult to draw, it can also be challenging 
trying to distinguish between Category 2 infractions and disregardable infractions. 
 
Grading of Representatives and Supervisors 
 
The framework also envisages that each representative is assigned48 a grade ranging from A to E, and that his 
entitlement to remuneration will be correspondingly affected by the grade. For example, an A grade 
representative is entitled to 100 per cent of his “specified”49 variable income whilst an E grade representative will 
receive 0 per cent to 25 per cent.50 An E grade representative is one who is guilty of one or more Category 1 
infractions or 30 per cent or five cases (or more) of Category 2 infractions. Grade A to B representatives are 
those who may have varying lesser degrees of Category 2 infractions.51 
 
An E grade also attracts the dire consequence of being placed under close supervision by the FA’s CEO or his 
designate; this close supervision includes being accompanied by a supervisor for at least five closed sales and 
being subject to full-scale post-transaction checks by the ISA Unit for every transaction for at least three 
months.52 The representative is also not allowed to perform any supervisory or managerial role for at least a 
year.53 It is also possible that prosecution and regulatory sanctions may follow. 
 
Supervisors are also graded. The grading of a supervisor considers the total percentage of variable income of all 
the representatives under his charge and assigns a grade according to the band of percentage. The range is as 
follows: Good (75 per cent to 100 per cent), Satisfactory (50 per cent to 74 per cent), Fair (25 per cent to 49 per 
cent) and Unsatisfactory (0 per cent to 24 per cent).54 In short, a supervisor’s grading correlates with the 
balanced scorecard performance of his representatives. Likewise, the supervisor is entitled to the same 
percentage of variable income as his representatives.55 
 
The consequence of obtaining an Unsatisfactory rating is that the FA must review the supervisor’s oversight of 
his representatives to ascertain if it is adequate and, where appropriate, reduce the number of representatives 
under his supervision or impose a moratorium on the supervisor’s recruitment of new representatives.56 The FA’s 
CEO is responsible for this review.57 
 
Further, where a direct supervisor of an E representative is assigned an Unsatisfactory grade in the same quarter 
as the E representative, the role of supervising that E representative must be performed by a supervisor in a 
higher tier who has not been assigned an Unsatisfactory grade.58 
 
In addition, the FA must assess the fitness and propriety of every E representative and every Unsatisfactory 
supervisor and, if necessary, take appropriate disciplinary action against him.59 
 
In summary, the FA has the responsibility to set up, maintain and oversee a BSF. Through and with the ISA Unit, 
the board and senior management have to: 
 
1.    regularly review and assess the transactions of representatives; 
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2.    classify infractions uncovered by the review (as well as by mystery shopping exercises and complaints); 
 
3.    grade the representatives and supervisors; 
 
4.    determine the percentage of variable income they are entitled to and recover unentitled amounts from them; 
 
5.    take remedial action on transactions affected by infractions; 
 
6.    scrutinise and watch over representatives and supervisors with poor grading; and 
 
7.    submit regular reports to MAS. 
 
 
 
Quarterly Balanced Scorecard Report 
 
The BSF and all its workings culminate in comprehensive and detailed quarterly reports in the format set out in 
Annex 2 of the Notice, from the FAs to the MAS. The compendious quarterly report should include the following 
data and information:60 
 
1.    Number of representatives and their grades, number placed under closed supervision, number with grades 
of B and lower, amount of variable income that representatives were not entitled to, details of infractions by E 
representatives, appeals and results of appeals; 
 
2.    Number of supervisors and their grades, details of supervisors grade Satisfactory or worse, amount of 
variable income not entitled, appeals and results of appeals; and 
 
3.    Statistics of client surveys, method of sampling, and number of cases of infractions uncovered through 
various processes. 
 
The reports are to be submitted within two calendar quarters of the quarter being measured.61 The time lag is 
sensible as no doubt an immense amount of effort and time will go into the preparation of the quarterly BSF 
reports by FAs and to the scrutiny of and response to these reports by MAS. 
 
As might be expected, the board and senior management of the FA are accountable for the implementation and 
workings of the BSF. 
 
The Role of Pre-transaction Checks 
 
Fully cognizant of the severe consequences of infractions (especially Category 1 infractions) being uncovered by 
the BSF, the MAS counsels, in the Guidelines, the use of pre-transaction checks by supervisors. Paragraph 26 
suggests in clear and strong terms: 
 
… a financial adviser should require its supervisors to review all the documentation and basis 
of every recommendation made or transaction handled by its representatives during the pre-
transaction stage (emphasis added). 
It continues: 
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Pre-transaction checks would help to minimise the impact of the (BSF) as any infraction uncovered by a 
supervisor during pre-transaction checks will not be factored into the (BSF) and will not affect the 
remuneration of the representatives as well as that of their supervisors. 
It appears that pre-emption, through the conscientious use of pre-transaction checks, may be the key to the 
smooth operation of the BSF. 
 
The pre-transaction checks should include documentation review and client call-backs.62 The checks can be 
carried out by internal non-sales staff or by third party providers or by a system-based method and should be 
completed by the effective date of the transaction or within a short time thereafter.63 
 
Where a product is found to be unsuitable during the pre-transaction checks, the FA must allow the client to 
modify or cancel his transaction without any loss or cost to the client.64 
 
Comments 
 
The BSF is a major development in the regulation of financial advisers. Conceptually and philosophically, it is 
sound – it is right that performance and the reward for performance of representatives and supervisors should be 
assessed holistically. Pragmatically, it is sensible and effective as it targets misconduct by representatives and 
their supervisors. But there are challenges. 
 
In the first place, the BSF depends on the quantitative assessment of qualitative performance, which is always a 
difficult thing. We have seen, for example, that a recommendation may not be simply suitable or unsuitable but 
instead involve a spectrum, such as clearly unsuitable/unsuitable/suitable/ clearly suitable/most suitable. 
 
We see a similar struggle as the line between Category 1 and Category 2 infractions is sought to be drawn 
through the thresholds of “material” impact, “gross” negligence and “serious” misconduct. But the law always has 
to grapple with the issue of threshold, resorting to the aforementioned terms as well as others such as “major”, 
“grave” or “excessive”. 
 
Further, a KPI such as fitness and propriety is inherently general and vague and lends itself to discretion and 
subjectivity. 
 
So the competence of the persons within the ISA Unit is critical. They need to have a very good grasp of the legal 
and regulatory COB framework in general and of the conceptual framework and criteria of the BSF in particular. 
Next, they have to have good appreciation of the dynamics of the due diligence and sales process within which 
representatives and supervisors work in order to know what is actionable and practical and what is not. Third, as 
they carry out their checks and fact-finding, they need to be adept in seeking out and ascertaining the veracity of 
evidence. Finally, as they apply their understanding of the legal and regulatory requirements to the facts as 
ascertained, they need the skill and judiciousness to accurately and fairly classify the infractions uncovered and, 
if its their assigned task, to fairly grade the representatives and supervisors and assign the appropriate 
percentage of remuneration entitlement. 
 
One result of the BSF is that infractions, including serious infractions will be uncovered and that negative 
consequences will follow. The conscientious implementation of pre-transaction checks will go a long way to 
reduce and soften the fear and apprehension of those who are subject to the system. Prevention is a lot less 
painful than cure. 
 
It is clear that a very substantial amount of resources and time will be expended for the purposes of the BSF. The 
challenge is to not impose an inordinately huge burden without reaping corresponding benefit. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The introduction of a balanced scorecard framework into the financial advisory industry is a laudable and 
ambitious initiative. The move, however, is not a simple one and may be likened to the opening of a Pandora’s 
box. If implemented with the requisite skill, reasonableness and good sense, the BSF can turn out to be a 
positive and desirable development and a significant and concrete step in the aspiration towards fair dealing. 
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